We characterize the relationship between ex post exchange rate depreciation and the interest differential for a set of countries that spans both developed and emerging market economies. The measured ex post uncovered interest differentials in terms of both levels and absolute values are then related to measures of trade and financial openness, financial development, government budget balances, institutional development, and exchange rate regimes. We find that there is wide diversity in the coefficient relating depreciations and interest differentials. Some of these differing results can be attributed to differences in inflation volatility, financial development, trade openness, capital account openness, legal development, and the nature of the exchange rate regimes. The robust results are mainly found in the developing/emerging market country grouping. JEL Classification Nos.: F31, F41
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Introduction
The evidence of financial globalization is everywhere around us. Capital flows are unprecedentedly large. The stocks of cross-border financial assets and liabilities are growing year by year.
Yet, at the same time, there is ample anecdotal evidence that flows of financial capital have not driven the returns expressed in common currency terms to equality. Some of this can be attributed to the fact that de facto impediments to arbitrage might still exist. Or it could also be that arbitrageurs are not able to access sufficient amounts of capital in order to drive expected profits to zero. This last interpretation appears to be consistent with the large practitioner literature focused the "carry trade".
In this study, we document the extent to which uncovered interest parity (combined with the rational expectations hypothesis) holds around the world, across both developed and emerging market economies. In doing so, we can quantitatively assess the extent to which one particular -price based -aspect of financial globalization has progressed.
The first part of our study focuses on study focuses on the coefficient relating ex post depreciation to the interest differential. With continuing globalization, we would expect to see increasing comovement of these two variables, so that a typical investor could not obtain a higher rate of return in one country versus another. To the extent that the point estimates associated with these types of tests of uncovered interest parity do not have a particular interpretation, in the second part of our empirical examination we focus on the ex post uncovered interest deviations as the object of interest, perhaps decreasing over time as globalization proceeds. Given that other factors might be changing over time as well, we 1 investigate whether the deviations -and their absolute values -are changing in response to changes in observable macroeconomic and policy variables.
While there is a tendency to view the interest rate parity area as a thoroughly mined research topic, we believe that examining the data from different perspectives will yield fruitful insights. Indeed, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the area, including the distinction between short and long horizon results (Chinn and Meredith, 2004) , and the differences between the developed country and emerging market experience (Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2006) .
In Section 2, a framework for thinking about interest rates and exchange rates, as they relate to interest rate parity conditions, is reviewed. Section 3 implements a series of time series regressions of ex post depreciations on interest differentials. Section 4 examines the empirical determinants of the ex post deviations from interest rate parity, as well as the absolute values of those deviations.
A Framework for Examining Financial Globalization
The uncovered interest differential can be decomposed into: 
where is the k-period forward rate, the term in square brackets is called covered interest differential, and the term is sometimes labeled risk premium. 
)
If covered interest parity holds,
i.e., the forward discount equals the interest differential, then one can say that the ex ante uncovered interest parity (UIP) differential is driven by the existence of exchange risk premium, η, that is defined as:
Substituting equation (2) into (1) then allows the expected change in the exchange rate from period t to period t+k be expressed as a function of the interest differential and the risk premium: Narrowly defined, UIP refers to the proposition embodied in equation (4) when the risk premium is zero. UIP would hold if investors are risk-neutral investors, or the underlying bonds are perfect substitutes.
1 In this case, the expected exchange rate change equals the current interest differential. Equation (4) is not directly testable, however, in the absence of observations on market expectations of future exchange rate movements. To make UIP testable, it is tested jointly with the assumption of rational expectations. Using the rational expectations methodology, future realizations of s t+k will equal the value expected at time t plus a white-noise error term ξ t,t+k that is uncorrelated with all information known at t, including the interest differential and the spot exchange rate, then one obtains what is commonly, if somewhat misleadingly, known as the UIP regression, ( )
where the left-hand side of equation (5) is the realized change in the exchange rate from t to t+k.
According to the unbiasedness hypothesis, the last two terms in equation (5) are assumed to be orthogonal to the interest differential. Thus, in a regression context, the estimated parameter on the interest differential will have a probability limit of unity in the following regression:
This specification is sometimes termed the "Fama" regression.
The combined assumptions of no risk premium in equation (6) (i.e. that UIP holds) and rational expectations is sometimes termed the "risk-neutral efficient-markets hypothesis" (RNEMH). In this case, the disturbance in equation (6) becomes simply the rational expectations forecast error ξ t,t+k , which by definition is orthogonal to all information known at time t, including the interest differential.
Unbiasedness is a weaker condition than RNEMH. All that is required is that any risk premium and/or non-rational expectations error be uncorrelated with the interest differential, while the RNEMH requires in addition that no other regressors known at time t should have explanatory power. 2 Ideally, in assessing the nature of the factors preventing parity conditions from holding, one would like to discriminate between covered interest differentials 3 and the exchange risk premium. However, data limitations preclude us from doing so in this experiment. Specifically, we have only incomplete data on forward rates, and do not observe expected exchange rate changes. In Chinn and Frankel (1994) , expectations are proxied with 2 The constant term may reflect a constant risk premium demanded by investors on foreign versus domestic assets. Default risk could play a similar role, although the latter possibility is less familiar because tests of UIP (as well as CIP) generally use returns on assets issued in offshore markets by borrowers with comparable credit ratings.
survey based data, which are unavailable to us for all these currencies. Hence, we will conduct the analysis keeping in mind that we impound the covered interest differential and the exchange risk premium into the uncovered interest differential.
The Fama Regression Results
Estimates of equation (6) for horizons that range up to one year typically reject the unbiasedness restriction on the slope parameter. For instance, the survey by Froot and Thaler (1990) finds an average estimate for β of -0.88.
4 Table 1 updates estimates of equation (6) for the period starting as early as 1984 for industrial countries (1990s for the emerging market economies, and later for transition economies) to 2006Q4. The exchange rates were expressed in terms of domestic currencies, and the annualized 3-month movements in exchange rates are regressed against differentials in onshore yields of the corresponding maturity.
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Panel A of the table encompasses the industrial countries' currencies, while Panel B refers to non-industrial. For the G-7 currencies, the results partly confirm the failure of the unbiasedness hypothesis, similar to findings obtained in other studies. 6 The Japanese yen exhibits a very negative coefficient, while Canada also rejects the null hypothesis of a unit coefficient. Interestingly, during the relatively short sample encompassing the ten years leading up to monetary union in 1999, most of the legacy currencies of the euro exhibit positive estimated β coefficients; in addition, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
The contrast with the results obtained in Chinn and Meredith (2004) is interesting, and can be attributed to the shorter, more recent, sample that encompasses the EMS crises of the early 1990's. This explains, for instance, the very positive coefficient for the British pound;
restricting the sample to the post-1992 period leads to a negative coefficient (albeit insignificantly different from unity -not reported). These results confirm the findings of Rose (1996, 2002) who found crisis episodes marked periods where UIP worked quite well.
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Our panel regression estimates (reported in Table 2 ) indicate that for both industrial country currencies, as well as the legacy currencies of the euro area before monetary union, the slope coefficient is highly positive. 8 For the former, the coefficient is 1.994, and for the latter 3.619. In both cases, the null of unity is rejected. These high coefficients are mainly driven by high depreciation of the currencies that experienced the EMS crisis in the early 1990s.
What has happened since the advent of monetary union? When the Fama regression is applied to the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro money market rate, the coefficient is very negative and statistically significantly different from unity, partly reflecting the absence of a currency crisis for the currency in the post-1998 period. (The regression result is reported at the bottom of Panel A.)
The results in Panel B of Table 1 present a striking contrast to those for the industrial country currencies. The estimates range from -10 for post-crisis Thailand to +3.3 for 6 The bias in the forward rate are viewed as exploitable by market participants; see Rosenberg (2002: 72-76) and Yilmaz (2005) . 7 Flood and Rose argue that the reason why UIP tends to work well during currency crises is because speculative attacks on a currency often prompt the monetary authority to raise the policy interest rate to defend the currency, and that exact action is usually offset by a large expected currency depreciation. 
Determinants of Deviations
Some Hypotheses
Return to equation (1):
Of course, we do not observe the last term on the right hand side of (1). But note that one could subtract the ex post depreciation from both sides of this equation to obtain:
Define our ex post deviation as:
This implies that the deviation is a function of the covered interest differential in [square brackets], the exchange risk premium in (parentheses) and the negative of the forecast error in {curled brackets}. DEV will be our primary variable of interest in this section.
We also calculate the absolute value of this variable:
We index these variables by currency, and generate annual variables as averages of the quarterly data. Denote these annual averages with "overbars". DEV is shown in Figures 3. In the figure, DEV is compared for different income groups, industrial countries (IDC) and developing/emerging market countries (LDC/EMG). One apparent observation we can make is that the UIP differentials spike into the negative territory when countries are experiencing crises. The two spikes for the non-industrial country group correspond to the tequila crisis of 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98. 9 Contrary to the widespread view that globalization has driven interest parity deviations closer to zero, we cannot observe a clear, discernable trend of shrinking differentials. Figure 4 illustrates the cross-sectional standard deviation of interest parity deviations for the country-pairs whose data are available since 1998. The pattern is consistent with that displayed in Figure 3 . 10 After experiencing a high level of volatility in the midst of the 1997-98 Asian crisis, interest parity differentials have become somewhat more stable, but in terms of the volatility, there does not seem to be any definitive trend.
Since we are interested in what factors contribute to the variability of interest parity deviations, we examine the determinants of both ADEV . . 9 For industrial countries that experienced the EMS crisis in the early 1990s, one can make the same generalization. In Figure 3 , however, large negative deviations of these countries are averaged out by other noncrisis countries.
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We treat these constructed variables as data to be used in the following regression:
where τ indexes time in years.
We estimate the regressions in a panel time series context, using annual data, and including time fixed effects. The estimation method is a robust regression which downweights outliers.
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We control for per capita income in all the regressions because it seems to proxy for many factors. Exclusion of per capita income does not change the results in any substantive way.
As we have already discussed in the context of equation (1), the deviations from the interest parity condition are composed of three types of deviations: covered interest differentials or political risk; the exchange risk premium; and the (negative of the) forecast error. Consequently, we can think of the determinants of these three entities as the determinants of the deviations from the interest parity condition (although each determinant might have offsetting effects on each individual component).
The first hypotheses we investigate is that these deviations are smaller -and ex post uncovered interest parity holds better -when monetary shocks are larger. On the other hand, if the monetary shocks are more volatile so that the trend in inflation is more difficult to discern, then the deviations will tend to be larger. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) documented 10 The figure illustrates the annual standard deviations of the original quarterly UIP deviations based on a balanced dataset for 37 countries (19 industrialized countries and 18 developing/emerging market countries). 11 We also implemented the regressions using panel OLS. The results were sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers, so we decided to focus on the robust regression results.
9 the importance of these factors. The variables for the rate and volatility of inflation should proxy for the degree to which expectations are likely to be unbiased, and testing on these variables is relevant to the forecast error component in equation (1) If an exchange risk premium is driving a wedge between returns expressed in a common currency, then there are numerous other candidates. The portfolio balance literature, as surveyed by Frankel (1984) suggests outstanding stocks of government debt, denominated in different currencies, might be of relevance. Without data on a wide set of countries, we opt to rely upon government budget surpluses expressed as a share of GDP as a proxy measure.
We also look into the effect of financial development, based on the prior that more developed financial markets may affect cross-border capital flows, and thereby contribute to driving arbitrage opportunities across different financial markets to zero (as financial openness may affect). However, measuring the level of financial development can be extremely complex since there are various kinds of financial markets (such as banking, equity, and bond markets) and several aspects of financial development (such as size, activeness, and cost performance/efficiency). Therefore, we construct a composite index that measures the overall level of financial development. The index, FD, is the first principal component of private credit creation, stock market capitalization, stock market total value, and life insurance premium as a ratio to GDP.
We also try some ad hoc measures. First is trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports over GDP. This measure is sometimes thought to be correlated with overall economic openness, and so may capture some aspects of de facto financial openness not captured by our de jure KAOPEN measure.
Political risk -the effect of actual or incipient restrictions on the mobility of capitalmight be correlated with the degree of institutional development. Hence, we assess the empirical importance of institutional development, with the presumption that the higher the level of institutional development, the less likely it will be that the authorities would restrict the mobility of capital. As a proxy measure of legal/institutional development, we use
LEGAL.
14 We also include measures accounting for the exchange rate regime. In principle, parity conditions should not be affected by the nature of the currency regime; however, since our measure is a composite of expectations errors, barriers to capital flows, and risk premia, it is very possible that there is some effect arising from the way in which currency fluctuations are managed. It may also be the case that the type of exchange rate regime selected is correlated with the existence of capital controls. To capture these effects of the type of the exchange rate regimes, we include dummy variables for the "intermediate" exchange rate regime as well as for the fixed exchange rate regime, following the definitions by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) . See Data Appendix for construction of the dummy variables. Rose (1996, 2002) examine the UIP during crisis episodes and find that the parity worked quite well during the crises. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for currency crises that is based on the exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996) . More details about construction of the dummy variable are found in Data Appendix.
We must make one last note before discussing the empirical results. Considering that the exchange rate is in the form of domestic currency value against U.S. dollars, and that the interest rate differentials are calculated against the U.S. interest rate, all the explanatory variables, except for the dummy variables, are included as relative sizes to U.S. levels. This way, we can identify the effects of individual currency countries.
Empirical Results
We conduct the investigation in two steps. First, we examine the determinants of the level of the deviations. Second, we assess the factors that are important to the behavior of the absolute value of the deviations.
In each case, we analyze the full-sample results, then stratify by level of economic development of the home country (the U.S. is always defined as the foreign country).
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Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the regression specifications described above, for a sample spanning all country currencies. It is important to note that the panel is not balanced, nor is the sample size constant over specifications. In the latter case, this outcome is due to the fact that some of the variables have differing coverage. Panel B reports the results for the industrial country currencies, while Panel C reports those results pertaining to the nonindustrial countries.
The coefficient estimates in the panels indicate that the deviations do depend upon income per capita. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) document that countries with higher per capita income are more likely to deviate from UIP. However, as a home country's per capita income rises, the gap between the home country and the U.S. shrinks, which can result in a smaller risk premiums, i.e., smaller interest parity deviations. Our analysis presents mixed results. With simpler models, higher income seems to shrink the size of the deviations.
However, as more regressors are included -so does the sample size shrinks, the opposite correlation seems to be true; countries with higher per capita income tend to deviate from the interest parity. Of course this is a statement regarding the average level of the deviation, as distinct from the slope coefficient relating ex post depreciation to interest differentials, so there is no necessary inconsistency.
Augmenting the specification with two inflation variables -the level and the volatility of inflation -seems to affect the per capita income coefficient and improves the goodness of fit slightly. Higher inflation may indicate stronger financial shocks, and therefore, would make it easier for UIP to hold, i.e., it should result in smaller deviations. 16 But no such correlation is found on the estimated coefficients of the inflation level. Higher inflation volatility, on the other hand, means higher inflation uncertainty, and therefore, causes more deviation from UIP. We find results consistent with this prediction persistently across different model specifications.
Financial development seems to reduce the deviation, as does greater financial openness, though only the former is found to be consistently significant across different model specifications. Inclusion of the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (KAOPEN) increases the statistical significance associated with inflation volatility. On the other hand, the government's budget surplus does not seem to matter for the level of UIP deviations.
One interesting aspect is an increase in our measure of institutional -or legaldevelopment tends to shrink the deviation. To the extent that political risk declines with institutional development, this outcome is consistent with our priors.
Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant role for exchange rate regimes and financial crises. However, this result depends upon the estimation method. Using standard OLS yields significant coefficients here.
Moving to the country grouping results, we obtain countries a substantially different picture in the case of the industrial countries. The first observation is that, relative to the full sample, the proportion of variance explained rises, even as the number of statistically 16 Stronger financial shocks can mean a higher predictability of inflation, that can be well-incorporated in both Financial development shrinks the size of the deviations. This effect is quite consistent in magnitude across specification. In addition, the institutional variable (legal development) is also significant in this sample.
One interesting distinction between the results for the two country groups relates to the impact of exchange rate regimes. While regimes of more exchange rate fixity tend to be the nominal interest rate and exchange rate, leading to smaller deviations from UIP.
associated with greater more positive deviations in the developing country subsample, no similar finding is obtained for the industrial country subsample.
Turning to the examination of the absolute value of the deviations (results reported in Table 4 ), many statistically significant coefficients are obtained. We attribute this finding to the fact that many of the variables are probably operating on the components of the differential in offsetting directions. The statistical significance is likely due to the fact that there is wide variation in the full sample. The same characteristic is exhibited in the developing country subsample, but not in the industrial country subsample.
In the full sample, higher inflation and higher inflation volatility induces larger absolute deviations. Both financial development and financial openness are also associated with smaller deviations. As was the case in the previous analysis, what is true in the full sample is not necessarily true in the industrial country subsample. Rather, it is clear that the results for the full sample are mainly driven by the non-industrial country subsample.
First, although it does not have a consistent impact on the deviations in the industrial country grouping, inflation volatility does increase the deviations the in the less developing country grouping. Capital account openness shrinks the deviations in the full sample as well as the developing country subsample, but its effect is not significant in the industrial country grouping. The same observation can be made about the effect of financial development.
Institutional development -as measured by the LEGAL variable -appears to be somewhat anomalous. The effect of institutional development is significantly positive in the full sample.
However, it is associated with smaller deviations in the industrial and developing country subsamples, though significantly only for the latter, that is consistent with theoretical 16 predictions. Overall, it might be the case that there is insufficient variability in the industrial country grouping to capture interesting effects.
One interesting divergence we detect is that the greater rigidity of an exchange rate regime has negative effects on the absolute deviation for developing countries while having no significant effects among industrial countries. 17 We conjecture that for emerging markets, the largest effect of the fixed exchange rate regime is to reduce exchange rate forecast errors, whereas for industrial countries, there is no such effect.
Lastly, we divide our sample by region and examine if there is any cross-regional differences in terms of the determinants of UIP deviations. Naturally, different regions should have different extent of financial integration as is the case of Western Europe and, to some extent, East Asia. For this purpose, we apply specification (9) in Table 4 to regional samples and conduct the estimation using absolute interest parity deviations. Rose (1996, 2002) . Considering that this sample includes the countries that experienced the Asian crisis, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, crisis episodes do seem to make countries' currency behavior more in line with the parity condition.
Concluding thoughts
We have examined the relationship between ex post exchange rate changes and interest differentials for a wide set of currencies. Our study differs from previous ones to the extent that we use appropriate interest rates (money market or government securities, rather than bank deposit rates), appropriately sampled. The countries in our sample are diverse; some are industrial countries, some are transition economies, some are emerging market countries. In addition, we examine the relationship between ex post uncovered interest differentials and macroeconomic and policy variables.
With this diverse sample, we first ran the "Fama" regressions -regress the ex post rate of currency depreciation on the interest rate differentials -for each country. Our evidence about the validity or rejection of the uncovered interest parity is highly diverse and inconclusive. One may conjecture that countries that experienced a currency crisis tend to have a very positive coefficient on the interest rate differentials. However, again, this indicates is that deviations could be small, but still be negatively correlated with interest differentials, and vice generalization does not appear to be universal. The goodness of fit for each country's regression is also found to be very low for most of the countries.
Given the wide diversity in the coefficient relating depreciations and interest rate differentials, we explored the determinants of ex post uncovered interest parity deviations by regressing the latter on possible candidate determinants.
What our analysis has highlighted is the fact that the coefficient from the Fama regression is not always informative with respect to ex post interest parity deviations. Factors that tend to correlate with failure to reject the UIP null hypothesis sometimes correlate with larger -not smaller -interest parity deviations.
Some of our results are intuitive. We find that financial development, capital account openness, and legal/institutional development negatively affect deviations from UIP, as theory suggests, but only for developing/emerging market countries Another key finding is that the results depend -sometimes in surprising ways -on how wide the sample is. In general, the industrial country results are distinct from the full sample and developing country sample results. This suggests that the lower degree of variability in the variables in the industrial country sample makes it harder to identify the strength of certain relationships.
We also examined the determinants of the absolute value of interest parity deviations among different regions, namely, Western Europe, developing East Asia & Pacific, and Latin America. Our findings suggest that, despite some anomalous results, some variables appear to behave consistently with theoretical predictions. More specifically, while higher levels of per capita income and the volatility of inflation tend to increase the size of interest rate parity versa.
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deviations in absolute terms, higher levels of financial development, financial openness, and legal development tend to reduce it. Also, the countries that experience a currency crisis tend to exhibit smaller deviations, as past studies have suggested.
While we have shed some light upon the cross-country, and cross-regional, variation in how ex post changes in exchange rates covary with interest differentials, we have by no means answered all questions. Nonetheless, in documenting how differentials vary with observable factors, we have hopefully set the stage for more research into the reasons why rates of return expressed in common currency terms have not been equalized.
Data Appendix
The exchange rate data are drawn from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, while the interest rate data are acquired from Bloomberg. The exchange rate and interest rate data are end-of-month. The interest rates are either 3 month Treasury bill yields (denoted as "TB") or money market rates. The sample periods for each of the interest rates are indicated below. The financial openness indicator is from Chinn and Ito (2007a) . The exchange rate regime indicators are originally drawn from the updated database for the classification used by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) . 2005 classifications are based on 2004 data. The dummy for the "fixed exchange rate regime" is assigned a value of one if the Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger (LYS) index takes the value of "5 = fix." The dummy for the "intermediate exchange rate regime" is assigned a value of one if the LYS index takes the value of either "4 = dirty/crawling peg" or "3 = dirty."
The financial development index (FD) is the first principal component of private credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capitalization (SMKC), stock market total value (SMTV), and life insurance premium as a ratio to GDP (LIFEINS). The financial development indicators are drawn from the World Bank's Financial Structure Dataset. See more details in Chinn and Ito (2007b) .
The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996) . The EMP index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The weights are inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample countries, and adjustment is made for the countries that experienced hyperinflation following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) . For countries without data to compute the EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison (2001) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are used.
The level of general legal development is measured by LEGAL, which is the first principal component of law and order (LAO), corruption (CORRUPT), and bureaucracy quality (BQ), all drawn from ICRG: International Country Risk Guide. For all variables, higher values indicate better conditions.
The inflation and exchange rate depreciation rates are calculated using exact formulas. 
